Showing posts with label Earnouts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Earnouts. Show all posts

Friday, August 4, 2017

Article Summary: Should You Take an Earnout? | Axial

By , Axial | 
I have pared down the article to the key points.  If you would like to read the entire article, click on the link at the bottom of the summary - Eric Gall


  • Earnouts are a way to bridge the gap between a seller’s expectation of value and a buyer’s willingness to pay. 
  • Earnout structure varies, but the idea is buyers make additional payments post-close, dependent on the business achieving certain goals.
  • When properly structured, earnouts can work very well. 
  • Earnouts can also turn nightmarish in the event of misaligned expectations, unfriendly terms, and hidden stipulations.

Photo by Robert Caplin

When Earnouts Go Wrong

Careful legal wording can protect against bad behavior. Examples are buyers making major changes that tank the company and rollups where buyers credited the wrong business with sales to avoid the earnout.
Earnouts can create misalignment of interests between management and shareholders leading to maximizing the earnout vs. maximizing shareholder value.
Clawbacks and Earnout Alternatives
Management incentive agreements preferred over earnouts.  Agreements should include assurances if the company is acquired the owner won’t be terminated or will receive a severance.
Clawbacks allow the seller to accept a lower valuation but if the company grows to a certain level, they ‘claw back’ equity.  Clawbacks align buyer and seller on a longer term basis than an earnout.

Advice for Sellers

Earnouts require protective provisions and need to be realistic.
  1. Make sure you have a cumulative clause for multiple year earnouts. 
  2. Be wary of buyers factoring in basic risk of the industry into the earnout. 
  3. Base the earnout on revenues, not EBITDA. 

Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com.

Sunday, September 11, 2016

Beyond the Headline Number: Terms to Consider in an M&A Deal | Axial



By  , Corum Group | 

When discussing client goals in a technology M&A engagement, we use the term “optimal outcome”  instead of “highest value.” While the topline number is often what gets the headlines, there are a large number of other factors that can make or break a deal. Understanding current market terms on everything from indemnities to earnouts to representations and warranties is vital when negotiating with a buyer, and favorable terms on these items are a vital component to an outcome that is truly optimal for a technology company seller.
Note: While these market terms are broadly applicable for middle-market M&A deals across industries, specific statistics refer to the technology industry.
Representations and Warranties: These are the assertions made by the seller to the buyer about what they are buying. Representations are about the current state of affairs, while warranties are about the future. Most of the terms below revolve around the specific ways to allocate the risk that any of the reps & warranties specified in the contract turn out to be untrue. The amount of money to be paid the buyer in this case is the indemnity.
Indemnity Escrow Amount: This is the portion of the purchase price held in escrow to serve as a fund to satisfy indemnification claims against the seller. Escrow amounts are typically calculated as a percentage of the purchase price. For technology companies this can range from less than 5% to greater than 15%; current market conditions generally put this in the range of 10% to 15%.
Indemnity Escrow Period: This is the length of time after the transaction closes that the indemnity escrow is held before being released to the seller. This can be less than a year to greater than two years, but currently runs between 12 and 18 months.
Reps & Warranties Survival Period: This is the length of time after closing during which a party may make claims for breaches of reps and warranties. Today’s market conditions put this between 12 and 18 months. This is also known as the “general survival period.”
Carve Outs to General Survival Period: Certain reps and warranties may be carved out of the general survival period, and be extended for a longer period of time. These include, but are not limited to, broker’s fees, employee benefits, intellectual property, taxes owed, capitalization, title to assets and due authority to make the sale in the first place.
Indemnity Basket Type: The basket defines the amount of indemnifiable losses a party must incur before it can seek indemnification. There are two types. The true deductible basket means that basket serves as a deductible, and the indemnifying party is responsible for all losses exceeding the basket amount. The tipping basket (also known as the dollar-one basket) means that the indemnifying party is responsible for all losses, once those losses reach the basket amount.
Indemnity Basket Size: The indemnity basket size differs based on the type of basket. Both true deductible and tipping baskets are calculated as a percentage of the purchase price, and both can range anywhere from 0.025% to greater than 1.5%. However, current market conditions set the true deductible basket size range from just south of 0.75% to 1%, while tipping basket size ranges are smaller, ranging from under 0.25% to 0.75%.
Indemnity Cap Size: This term limits a party’s maximum liability. For most deals today, the cap typically ends up at 15% of the purchase price.
In addition to indemnifications, there are a handful of other terms that can change based on current market conditions.
Earnouts: Earnouts are not standard in today’s environment, but can become part of the consideration in some cases. Most often they are used to bridge the gap between the buyer and seller’s enterprise valuation expectations, but they can also be used as a sweetener to retain key employees.
Asset Deals & Assumption of Liabilities: In a “vanilla” asset deal, all liabilities are retained by the selling company, while all assets go to the acquirer. However, there are typically specified liabilities and assets that the buyer will acquire; these are determined during negotiation.
Stock Deal Structures: Today’s market conditions generally encourage a cash-free, debt-free transaction with working capital provisions to ensure that business is not disrupted. Any excess cash on the balance sheet is typically either dividended out to shareholders or left in the company and added to the purchase price.
While specific market conditions generally prevail in all these circumstances, all of these items can — and must — be negotiated prior to closing. That’s one reason you want to be sure to have a legal and advisory team that not only knows and understands current market expectations, but that has the respect of the buyer, command of the terms, and deep negotiation experience.
Article LINK
For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.

Sunday, August 21, 2016

Earnouts or Burnouts: Don't Get Burned on an Earnout | Divestopedia

Takeaway: Earnouts are difficult legal clauses to manage and can often lead to misunderstanding and difficulty realizing them. Here is a practical example of some of the pitfalls that sellers should watch for.
Earnouts or Burnouts: Don't Get Burned on an Earnout
Source: Ra2Studio/Dreamstime.com















Earnout clauses are becoming more and more common in purchase and sale agreements, especially in a volatile economy or where the target company’s earnings have fluctuated over past years. There are many risks associated with earnouts and if their provisions are not properly drafted in the definitive agreement, then the seller stands a good chance of getting burned.
Here is an example of where a seller can get burned on an earnout:

Pre-Sale Background

OPCO is a company which is comprised of two divisions: Division A, which provides services to customers; and Division B, which sells goods complementary to its services. The revenue streams from these two divisions can be broken down as follows:
  • Division A (services) - $900,000 of OPCO Revenues
    • High margin (large) clients ($700,000)
    • Low margin (small) clients ($200,000)
  • Division B (goods) - $100,000 of OPCO Revenues
Mr. A buys all of the shares in OPCO from Mr. B. Contained in the share purchase agreement is a very basic earnout clause which states, in so many words, that if OPCO meets certain revenue targets during the earnout period, then Mr. B will be entitled to an earnout amount from Mr. A. The earnout period in this example is one year. As with most earnouts, the revenue target was an ambitious number based largely on a three-year average of historical revenues. In order to meet this target, OPCO would need to run lean and have a solid year of earnings.

Post-Closing

Mr. A, like many entrepreneurs, has big plans for OPCO. Coming from a sales background, he sees tremendous opportunities for growth in Division B by selling more goods to OPCO’s existing customer base and new customers alike; he sees this as a long-term growth strategy. As with most small businesses, time and resources are not unlimited and to expend more time and resources in one division of a business would necessitate less time and resources in another division.

So, immediately upon acquiring ownership of OPCO, Mr. A implements his marketing plan for Division B growth and allocates more resources and personnel to Division B, pulling these additional resources and personnel from the low margin portion of Division A. This is an easy decision for Mr. A because, although the low margin portion of Division A contributed to 20 percent of OPCO’s revenues, it also consumed more than 30 percent of the company's resources and personnel.

During the earnout period, Mr. A is successful at growing Division B revenues by $50,000. In contrast, because the resources required to support this growth were taken from Division A, it suffers a $100,000 decline in revenues. This results in a $50,000 decline in overall revenues during the earnout period, OPCO not meeting its revenue target, and Mr. B, therefore, not receiving his earnout amount. In hindsight, it was quite foreseeable that OPCO would have met its revenue target had Mr. A operated OPCO the way Mr. B had operated it historically and not taken a gamble on Division B.

Mr. A's gamble did not pay off immediately, at least not within the earnout period. While OPCO may have experienced substantial Division B growth in the following years as a result of Mr. A’s efforts, none of this is relevant to Mr. B and he paid the price for Mr. A's long-term growth strategy.

How Can This be Prevented?

In the case at hand, the share purchase agreement contained your most basic earnout clause, which is common, especially on smaller transactions,because neither the buyer’s nor the seller’s budget permits the drafting of a more comprehensive earnout clause. Some things that a seller (Mr. B in this case) can do to minimize the likelihood of getting burned on an earnout include:

Post-Closing Covenants

The first option is to include more comprehensive earnout language in the share purchase agreement and impose post-closing covenants with the buyer. These post-closing covenants would seek to restrict the way in which the buyer can operate the business during the earnout period. These types of post-closing covenants might include, but are not limited to, the following:
  • Restricting the buyer from conducting the business in such a manner that it is reasonably foreseeable that the business could be negatively impacted in a material way (such as shifting resources in the manner set out in the example above).
  • Restricting the buyer from permitting any material change to the business or its financial or accounting methods (such as by combining financial reporting with an affiliate company).
  • Restricting the buyer’s ability to strip assets or divisions out of OPCO (such as by transferring the operations of one division to an affiliate company).
  • Restricting the buyer's ability to terminate the employment of any key employees.
  • Requiring the buyer to continue to operate the business in the ordinary course of business.

Reverse Earnout

Draft the earnout as a reverse earnout. In contrast to a regular earnout where the payment of the earnout amount is deferred to the end of the earnout period, with a reverse earnout the amount is paid to the seller on closing and then adjusted downward if OPCO doesn't meet its revenue targets. The benefit of a reverse earnout is that it places the burden on the buyer to pursue the seller for a refund of the earnout amount. If the seller has any legitimate defenses to this, such as the buyer breaching its post-closing earnout covenants, it will make it the buyer's responsibility to take further steps (e.g. court action) to recover this amount. Depending on how comprehensively the provisions are drafted, a standalone earnout agreement might better serve your purposes.

In Conclusion, It's Always Best to Get Some Advice

As you can see, there are ways to protect yourself if you are a seller that is subject to an earnout piece of your selling price. Retaining legal counsel that is experienced in these types of transactions will benefit you tremendously by ensuring that your earnout language protects you as much as possible from the scenario above and the many other scenarios where the buyer intentionally or inadvertently fails to meet its revenue targets.

Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.

Monday, June 20, 2016

For High-Tech M&A, Strategic Value is Not Automatic | Divestopedia

By  ,  
Takeaway: If you are a B2B company, it's important to get multiple buyers involved and to get at least one of them to acknowledge the strategic value.
For High-Tech M&A, Strategic Value is Not Automatic
Source: Rancz Andrei - Dreamstime.com






















Wow did I get a real world demonstration of the saying, "Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder," recently. If I could rephrase that to the business sale situation it could be, "Strategic value is in the eyes of each unique buyer." We were representing a small company that had an online hospital information system - specifically, a nurse staffing and shift bidding and scheduling application. They had received a handful of sales from some of the early adapters in the hospital industry.

Raising Capital vs. Selling

The owner was at a crossroads. To keep up with their very well funded competitor (some of the Web MD investors launched a competing product), they recognized that they would require a substantial capital investment. They understood that they had a window of opportunity to achieve a meaningful footprint before their much better capitalized competitor established market dominance. They realized that their ability to scale was critical to their ultimate success and felt their best route was to sell out to a strategic buyer.
The good news is that the owner made a very sound decision going this route rather than trying to raise capital. Speed to market was critical and he reasoned that the strategic acquirer route would be more expeditious than the capital raise approach. He recognized that his company, standing alone would not be able to overcome the conservative hospital decision process of going with the well-known, branded, larger vendor.

Identifying the Perfect Buyer

The ideal company buyer is a larger company that provides information technology and software products in the human resources and staffing departments within hospitals. They could plug this software capability into their existing product line and distribution channel and immediately drive additional sales. They would strengthen their position within their accounts and prospects by offering an additional productivity enhancing product that would promote companion product sales. It would also provide a unique door-opener to other major accounts that would want this high ROI product.
With the input from our clients, we located a handful of companies that fit this profile. We were pretty excited at the prospects of our potential buyers recognizing all of these value drivers and making purchase offers that were not based on historical financial performance. The book, memorandum, confidential business review, executive summary, or whatever your investment banker or merger and acquisition advisor calls it, will certainly point out all of the strategic value that this company can provide the company that is lucky enough to buy it.
As part of the buying process, we usually distribute the "book" and then get a round of additional questions from the buyer. We submit those to our client and then provide the answers to the buyer with a request for a conference call. We had moved the process to this point with two buyers that we thought were similar strategic buyers. The two conference calls were surprisingly totally different.

Option #1: The Financial Buyer

The first one included the M&A advisor and the Chief Financial Officer. Their questions really indicated that they were used to analyzing potential acquisitions strictly from a financial perspective. They focused on our client's EBITDA, gross margin, growth rate, cost of customer acquisition and other historical financial metrics. We had a very bad vibe from these guys. They were refusing to recognize that this was a high gross margin product growing in sales to more than 200% year-over-year, and had a higher level of selling and promotional expense than a mature commodity software application. We couldn't determine if they just didn't get it or were being dumb like a fox to dampen our value expectations.

Option #2: The Strategic Buyer

The second call from the other company included the M&A advisor and the HR systems product manager. The whole tone of the questioning was different. The questions focused on growth in sales, pricing power, new client potential, growth strategy, their status at the major accounts, and ownership of intellectual property.

Differences in Purchase Offers

Well, we got the initial offers and they could not have been more different. The first company could not get beyond evaluating the acquisition as if it were moving forward in the hands of the current owner and with his ability to grow the business. Their offer was an EBITDA multiple bid without taking into consideration that the product sales had grown to more than 200% year-over-year and the marketing and promotional expenses were heavily front end loaded. In spite of our efforts to convey that this was a competitive bid situation and that we were in front of their competitors, they refused to be moved off this financial approach to the valuation of this high-potential product.
The second company understood the strategic value and they reflected it in their offer. We had done a good deal of strategic positioning with this buyer. We discussed with them the tremendous potential growth rate they could achieve with this product being incorporated into their product portfolio and being sold into their install base, and prospects through their highly developed distribution channels. We recognized that they would not pay for this potential with all cash at closing. So, we encouraged them to include a significant portion of transaction value in an earnout based on product sales over the next three years.
The financial buyer's first offer was all cash at close. When we compared that offer to the conservative mid-point of our strategic buyer's combined cash and earnout offer, our transaction value was 300% higher with the strategic buyer. This was the biggest disparity between offers I have ever experienced, but it was quite instructive as to the necessity to get multiple opinions by the market of potential buyers. This is especially important where a meaningful percentage of the company's value is contained in their technology and intellectual property.

Establish Strategic Value

There are some companies that, no matter how hard we try, will not be perceived as a strategic acquisition by any buyer and they are going to sell at a financial multiple. Those companies are often Main Street type companies like gas stations, convenience stores and dry cleaners that are acquired by individual buyers. If you are a B2B company, software, high-tech, health care technology company, have a competitive niche, and are not selling into a commodity type pricing structure, it is important to get multiple buyers involved and to get at least one of those buyers to acknowledge the strategic value.
Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.

Thursday, May 26, 2016

In a Business Sale, the Buyer Has the Upper Hand (Part 3) | Divestopedia

By  ,  

Takeaway: This is part three of a three-part series that identifies the natural advantages that business buyers bring to the table before the transaction process even starts.
In a Business Sale, the Buyer Has the Upper Hand (Part 3)
Source: Bowie15 - Dreamstime.com















In parts one and two of this article series, we discussed the natural experiential advantages that a business buyer's team would bring to the table in a business sale transaction; identified buyer attacks on the transaction value during the negotiation and LOI process; and offered approaches you can use to hold your ground against this formidable opponent in regards to the working capital adjustment, benchmarks and earnouts. In this article, we continue to view this negotiation process like a fencing match; buyer thrust, seller parry.

The Due Diligence Surprise

Thrust - "We noticed that your average billing per customer is smaller than our average billing rate, we are going to have to adjust our value."
Parry - "What about the memorandum, the detailed customer lists, the monthly billing report that you reviewed prior to executing the LOI didn't you understand? Our price is firm. If you want to adjust, we are cancelling the LOI and we are back on the market."
Thrust - "We noticed that you had a spike in this particular type of revenue which is unusually profitable. We do not believe that this is sustainable and are going to have to adjust our bid to account for that."
Parry - If you analyze it correctly, last year was pretty much the norm for this type of revenue. The year prior was actually the outlier and much lower than average. Secondly, if you truly allocated corporate overhead to this income category, you would find it about the same level of profitability as our other lines of business. No adjustment is warranted."
Okay, we held our own during that round. Now it is just a formality to get the purchase agreements signed and provide our wire transfer instructions. Not yet, pick up your sword.

Unreasonable Reps and Warranties

Thrust - You receive the definitive purchase agreement from the buyer's attorney and it looks like you have to rep and warranty your first born in order to get the deal signed. All of a sudden you see escrows and holdbacks, and guarantees that were not mentioned in the LOI. Much of that is pretty standard stuff, although it will be very slanted to the benefit of the buyer.
Parry - No material changes to the deal economics allowed. "We signed the LOI and provided you a no-shop in order to allow you to perform due diligence. We were very detailed in our LOI in order to compare your bid with others that were very close. Without any legitimate finding of misinformation in the due diligence process, the economics remain the same."
As for the scary reps and warranties, holdbacks and escrows, we let our lawyers talk with their lawyers. It is almost like they have the lawyers' secret pinky handshake and they carve through this language with clarity and precision. What it usually boils down to is what is reasonable and customary in transactions that are similar to this one. If there are any remaining issues, they identify them and ask the seller and his/her advisor to work them out with the buyer. By this stage, these final points are settled constructively.

Delayed Closing Date

Thrust - "Oh, just one more thing, you are going to throw in the floor mats and the undercoating at no charge." We tell our clients to expect this because it is just the nature of the buyers. Here is how it is manifested in a business sale transaction. The closing date is set for September 30, month end. "We want to move the closing date back to October 7 so we can take a look at your month end numbers. Do you have any concerns?" No, we just want to make sure things are on track.
Parry - Not much we can do about this one but try to anticipate what they may be looking at for that final attack on value and to prepare our counter attack. This one is a little trickier, however, because in prior attacks we had the luxury of time in order to strategize and craft our response. This one is usually real time where emotions are on the jagged edge. We ask our client to prepare a response to our anticipated last minute objection and then we, as their advisors, take the first attack. We want to have the client stay above the fray and preserve their relationship for the upcoming partnership together. If that effort is not accepted and the buyer insists on an adjustment based on, "It looks like you are not tracking to hit your first year earnout target," we prepare the seller with, "You know that we put in the earnout in order to align your interests with ours going forward. I have a good deal of transaction value tied to hitting our targets and I would not have signed this agreement unless I was fully confident that I would collect every dollar of that earnout."

Stalemate

Unfortunately, in spite of my best efforts, I view a stalemate as the best outcome we can hope for once we are off the market. As you can see, the leverage totally shifts to the buyer. The price is never increased during due diligence and contract negotiation. There is pressure to even keep the business flat during this process because a good deal of the owner's attention and emotions are going to be focused on the process of selling his/her business as opposed to just running his/her business. So our process is to make it evident that there are several qualified buyers that are very close in their offers to the winning offer. If there is buyer bad behavior we can simply plug in the next best bidder. The other major strategy we employ is to recommend our client execute a very detailed-, formula- and example-driven LOI.
Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

In a Business Sale, the Buyer Has the Upper Hand (Part 2) | Divestopeida

By  ,  

Takeaway: This is part two of a three-part series that identifies the natural advantages that business buyers bring to the table before the transaction process even starts.
In a Business Sale, the Buyer Has the Upper Hand (Part 2)
Source: Bowie15 - Dreamstime.com















In part one of this article series, we discussed the natural experiential advantages that a business buyer's team would bring to the table in a business sale transaction. The seller is usually embarking on their first business sale, whereas the buyer has often completed dozens of prior transactions. So, from the start, the seller is subject to a process that greatly favors the business buyer. This article will identify in the negotiation and LOI process, buyer attacks on the transaction value and approaches you can use to hold your ground against this formidable opponent. Several subtle and seemingly harmless clauses in the LOI can result in swings in actual transaction value of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It may be helpful to look at this negotiation like a fencing match; buyer thrust, seller parry.

Thrust and Parry

Thrust - a buyer getting you off the market with a loosely worded LOI that allows him/her to "interpret the terms" in his/her favor deep into the due diligence process. This is the number one seller error in the process and results in either the deal blowing up or the seller taking an unnecessary hair cut.
Parry - a seller not counter-signing the LOI until terms are defined. There are several key terms of the LOI, so we will give each one their own "Thrust" and "Parry."

Working Capital Adjustment

Thrust - A buyer-attempted treatment of working capital. Most buyers attempt initial language for working capital in the LOI that looks something like this:
Working Capital Adjustment: There shall be a typical working capital adjustment to accommodate for changes to the working capital balance, including cash, accounts receivable and accounts payable, as of the day of closing. During due diligence, the purchaser will set a working capital target by determining a normal and customary level of current assets, including a positive cash balance. There shall be sufficient working capital, including a cash balance which shall be sufficient to operate the business on an ongoing day-to-day basis and the buyer will not need to fund working capital simply to operate the business immediately after the transaction.
Parry - Not so fast, Zorro! This seems like a perfectly reasonable treatment and, unfortunately, many unsuspecting sellers will counter-sign an LOI with this language in place. The result of this is either he/she is going to get taken to the cleaners on the level the buyer decides on, deep into the due diligence process, or the seller will blow up the deal deep into the process. Neither a good result, and the sad part is that it could easily be prevented. The first rule of LOIs is to not take your company off the market with a very important term not defined up front. This language enables their team of experts to calculate their own opinion of "reasonable and customary" while you have no negotiating leverage. You have already taken your company off the market as a buyer requirement to enable due diligence with a no-shop clause.

Missing Benchmarks

The second very important mistake is that by leaving that term undefined, you have not really benchmarked the proposed transaction value against other bids. We had a client that kept a net working capital surplus far greater than what was normally required to run the business. Let's say that they kept a surplus of $400,000 when their normal monthly business expenses were $100,000. So, the level could be set as a surplus of $100,000.
Now the buyers bring in their experts and look at your last 12 months' balance sheets and proclaim that your historical level of $400,000 is what they need, then you may have just sacrificed $300,000 of transaction value. If you have one buyer that bids $3,000,000 for your company with a net working capital surplus requirement of $100,000 and you close with $400,000 surplus, $300,000 is returned to you as transaction value. This makes the total transaction value $3,300,000. If the undefined working capital surplus buyer bids $3,100,000 and calculates, after the LOI, that his requirement is $400,000, then his transaction value is short the other bid by $200,000!
This can all be prevented by the seller insisting that the LOI include a net working capital level commitment with the calculation methodology spelled out. Each buyer may have their own opinion of what that number should be, but this exercise will allow you to equalize the bids and determine which one is truly superior. Unfortunately, the buyers try to leave this vague in their LOI so that 90 days into the due diligence process, they render their buyer favorable opinion and count on the seller suffering from deal fatigue and just caving in on this meaningful loss in value. The buyers know that they do damage to your future chances if you put your company back on the market with the stigma of the previous deal blowing up during due diligence. It usually results in a market discount being applied to your company the second time around.

The 'All or Nothing' Earnout Clause

Thrust - An earnout clause with punitive "all or nothing" language. In the realm of SMB mergers and acquisitions, an earnout is a common practice and a perfectly reasonable component of a business sale transaction. It is often an effective way to bridge the valuation gap between the buyer and seller, and to align the interests of the buyer and seller for post-acquisition business performance. But like other components here, there is good earnout language and there is earnout language that is one-sided in favor of the buyer.
An example of earnout language from a buyer LOI is: The total earnout shall be paid over three years. The total possible payout amount is $1.5 million, based on growing EBITDA by 5% per year over last year's rate of $1,250,000.
The target EBITDA in year one is $1,312,500, year two is $1,378,125, and year three is $1,447,031. If the target is hit, the payout will be $500,000 for the year. If the achievement is between 85% - 99% of the target, the payout will be that percentage attainment X $500,000. If the attainment is less than 85% of the target, no earnout payment will be made.
Parry - In general, we recommend that earnouts be based on a number that cannot be easily manipulated by the buying company. So measures like net profit and EBITDA are less favorable. Here they can insert some expense items like "corporate overhead," which are out of your control. We prefer tying earnouts to measures such as total sales or gross profit margin; far more difficult to leave up to interpretation.
Next, we never recommend an "all or nothing" earnout clause. Normally, earnouts are a meaningful percentage of the overall transaction value and, if an unforeseen event takes you below their cut-off target, you have sacrificed some serious value. Our argument is that if there is a big shortfall, the percent of that shortfall in their earnout payment is enough to keep buyer and seller interests aligned post-acquisition.
If there is a downside adjustment in the earnout calculation (there always is) then we like to have the corresponding upside for surpassing target performance. In other words, if you miss your target by 10% then you only receive 90% of that year's earnout payment target. If you hit 110% of your target, your earnout payment should be 110% of that target.
We also recommend that the earnout be formula-driven and include an example calculation as shown here. The earnout total would be $1,500,000 and be paid in the first three years after the closing within 30 days of the anniversary date. The earnout would be based on the trailing twelve months' revenues and a target to grow those revenues by 5% per year over the first three years following closing. So, the target for year one (again using the prior year end as the example) would be $5,000,000 X 1.05 = $5,250,000. For year two, another 5% growth would result in a target of $5,512,500. And for year three, another 5% growth would result in a target of $5,788,125, for a three-year total of $15,550,625. Dividing this by the total earnout payment at target ($1,500,000) results in an earnout payment of 9.06% of revenues for the first three years. The payment would be made annually within 30 days of closing of the company's books for 12, 24 and 36 months following closing.
For each year's earnout payment, the actual payout amount would be calculated by applying the payout percentage rate of 9.06% X the actual revenues. As an example, if the revenue for year three came in at $5,000,000 that would be multiplied by 9.06% and result in an earnout payment of $453,000. If the year three revenues came in at $6,000,000, the earnout payment would be $546,600.
Great, we have handled each thrust with our skillful parry. Match over, right? Keep that face protector on, the match is just heating up. Continue reading part three here.
Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.

Sunday, March 13, 2016

How to Increase the Probability of a Successful Exit | Divestopedia

By  ,  


Takeaway: Have you defined what a "successful" exit actually looks like? Do you have a realistic goal for when you want to sell the company and how much you want to sell it for?
How to Increase the Probability of a Successful Exit
In this podcast, Dr. Basil Peters, author of "Early Exits," talks about:
  • What are the biggest mistakes when you’re selling your company;
  • The importance of having an exit strategy and the need to develop better practices on exit timing; and
  • Tips on how to increase the probability of a successful exit.

About the Guest

Dr. Basil Peters is an M&A advisor, exit coach and angel investor. Dr. Peters is the CEO of Strategic Exits Corp, a firm specializing in optimum exits for technology companies. Dr. Peters managed three top performing funds, a hedge fund, a venture capital fund and an angel fund. He has been a technology company CEO in Vancouver and Silicon Valley.
Basil writes a blog on exits at www.Exits.com/Blog. His first book, "Early Exits - Exit Strategies for Entrepreneurs and Angel Investors (But Maybe Not Venture Capitalists)," was selected by Inc Magazine as one of the ten best business books of the year.

Listen Here:



You can also get this Podcast by:

Read the Full Transcript Here:

Noah Rosenfarb: Hello everyone and welcome. It’s Noah Rosenfarb from Freedom Business Advisors here with another great guest, Dr. Basil Peters. He is the author of a wonderful new book called "Early Exits," but beyond that he is the CEO of Strategic Exits Corp and he has done a lot of amazing things. Basil, thanks for coming on the show.
Basil Peters: Thanks for inviting me, Noah.
Noah Rosenfarb: My pleasure. Why don’t you our audience how your first introduction to exits, when you built and sold your company? Walk me through what happened there.
Basil Peters: I’m an engineer and really I’m a geek, techy, nerd – whatever you want to call somebody who has been fascinated by technology from a young age. I went through, got a PhD in Electrical and Computer Engineering. When I was at grad school, I started a company in the actual electrical engineering building at my alma mater and we manufactured equipment for satellite television and cable television applications. We grew that to be the second largest company in the world of that type and I was the chairman and CEO right from the founding all the way through to the exit.
My first introduction to everything not to do when you’re selling your company was in actually living through that first exit where much later in my career, I finally had the courage to go back and actually admit to myself all of the things that I did wrong in that first exit. When I say courage, I’m not exaggerating. It was actually very difficult for me and very painful for me to recall all of the things that I now know and I shouldn’t have done or could have done better in that first experience.
Noah Rosenfarb: How long were you operating that company?
Basil Peters: From the founding through to the eventual sale was between 11 and 12 years, depending on how you count the sale date. So we get up to about 500 employees. We were a pretty good sized company and we actually ended up selling the company to our largest competitor, which was a Fortune 500 company called Scientific Atlanta and then they were subsequently acquired by Cisco. So the company that I started in grad school is actually still alive and well. It’s a part of Cisco. Some of the people I hired right out of school are still working at Cisco on the business that I started many years ago, which is quite gratifying.
Noah Rosenfarb: So what seems to be such an outward success story, you know, building a business from nothing to 500 employees over a decade, selling it to what was a wonderful brand name and which in turn became Cisco and it still lives on. What would you say are some of the biggest mistakes in spite of the story that sounds so wonderful and what everybody wants?
Basil Peters: Well what everybody wants I hope, Noah, is to have a successful exit and I think to be fair, I cannot count that first experience as a successful exit. Yes, it was an exit but it wasn’t what I would call successful because we didn’t do some of the things that I now hope that all good boards, founders, and CEOs would do. If anybody wants to learn more about everything that I did wrong in that first experience, the most popular video on my blog has, for years, been top off the gate, the Entrepreneur’s Organization. When they wanted me to come in and tell a war story, tell a story about all the things not to do and that was when I first enumerated all of the mistakes that I made in that first exit and on my blog, you can find that either by searching “how not to sell a company” or something like that. It’s pretty prominent out there.
Let me tell you a few of the things that I wished I had been better educated or I wish my board members had been more knowledgeable about in that first exit. The first thing was we never had an exit strategy. At no time, even though we had seven people on the board most of time and they were good, intelligent, experienced angels and VCs, at no time in the history of the company did we have a conversation about the exit strategy. I’m embarrassed to admit that today and I’m still quite mortified by how many companies when I ask the CEO or I ask directors what the exit strategy is, I get a blank stare back. Not having that exit strategy, not having any understanding of what was we were trying to do when we came to work every day, having no goal that we could align the company and its team around, led to a couple of other serious shortcomings in the eventual exit process.
One of them was that we did not time our exit well. We actually let ourselves be at the mercy of the external macroeconomic events and that’s what determined when we decided to start the exit. Like I see in so many companies, when things were going wonderfully well, when every quarter we were telling more and every quarter the profits are pulling up, when my biggest challenge was how to hire more people, I never thought for a minute about selling the company. It was just too much fun, but as I’ve now come to appreciate that absolutely the best time to be thinking about selling the company when everything is going perfectly.
If I could go back today and talk to my 40-year-old self, the first thing I’d do is I’ll grab myself by the lapels, whack myself up in the head with a brick and say, “Everything is going perfectly. For heaven’s sake, sell the company now,” because companies are started and often managed by entrepreneurs who are eternal optimists, we are really bad at doing that. We are really good at seeing the potential of growing the company in the future, we’re really good at imagining how much more it will be worth if we can just continue on this growth track, but almost universally, we’re terrible at assessing risk and in the financial world, risk and reward are inextricably interrelated. That’s why so many entrepreneurs end up doing what I did which was to have a less than successful exit when they finally sell the company they have been working on for so many years of their lives.
Noah Rosenfarb: Yeah. Would you say that was a predominantly from a financial standpoint or even emotionally and going to work for the buyer or whatever transgressed after that?
Basil Peters: I think the financial part is not the biggest part of what I would consider successful. In most exits, in most company sales, the event has much greater impact outside of the financial sphere. For most founders, most CEOs, often even for angel investors, the exit is a life changing event and one of the ways that I describe my lack of complete success and one of the things that I speak very often to groups of entrepreneurs about is timing your exit better so that you don’t live through a phase of your life like I did where for a better part of a couple of years, I would go into work every day. I’d work 12 maybe 14 hours. I’d work hard. I’d work smart and then I drive home. In the worst times, I would think to myself that today after working hard for 12 or 14 hours, I probably lost $10,000 or $20,000 personally.
That happened in our case because we got into a change in the macroeconomic environment and no matter how hard we worked, there was nothing we could do to prevent the value of the company from decreasing. In my own case, I lived through a couple of the worst years of my life where all I could do was just go in there and work my heart out, but the result everyday was I was $10,000 or $20,000 poorer everyday for like a couple of years. That was kind of painful and that is something I am devoting a good part of my life to providing the knowledge and the skills to entrepreneurs and investors to prevent that from happening to them because as I say in my workshop, “That’s part of your life you’re never going to get back.”
Noah Rosenfarb: If I had to recalibrate that into like a financial term, are you saying if you backload your sale with an earn out and you’re not taking enough chips off the table upfront to make you feel like you have a successful exit, you’re just leaving too much risk in the company without the upside?
Basil Peters: Let me do it even better than that, Noah. Let me describe it in how it happened for me. I believe that if we had an exit strategy and I know that if we timed the exit just a little bit better, like let’s say we sold two years earlier than we did, I could have gone and taken my family and lived in the most expensive resort in the world for those two years and I still would had more money left over than I did for working my heart out for that two-year period because the difference in what we could have gotten if we’d sold at the top and what we ended up selling for, I probably could have lived for 10 years in the most expensive resort in the world.
That’s kind of what I wish for entrepreneurs and shareholders is if they had an exit strategy, if they were better at exit timing and you could see your life taking two paths – in one path you work your heart out, you go home poorer every day, not that much fun. In the other path, you sell at a better time and you spend that time instead in the most expensive resort in the world just doing whatever you want to do – and you end up at the end of those two with about the same amount of money. In the future, my preference is to stay at the most expensive resort in the world and I’m doing whatever I can to help more entrepreneurs, more shareholders, more angel investors make that choice rather than letting events happen to them, letting the exit be driven by external events rather than a well thought out exit strategy.
Noah Rosenfarb: Rob Slee’s is famous for saying that, “We can’t time the public markets but we could time the private market.”“We can’t time the public markets but we could time the private market.” Do you agree with that?
Basil Peters: I do and just to make sure that we’re being clear to our audience here, none of us can predict the timing of the markets very well. We don’t know what’s going to happen in the economy. There are events that even the chairman of the Fed can’t foresee, but what we can do and to Rob Slee’s point is we can decide when we want to sell our company. That is such an enormous opportunity for any shareholder of any private company to think about the optimum timing, the amount that you could end up making might be 2, 3, 5 times more. I’ve seen cases where it was 50 or 100 times more just by getting the timing closer to the optimum. Again, this is one of the things that entrepreneurs and shareholders of every type whether they are friends and family investors, whether they angel investors, and whether they are venture capital investors.
One of the things that we just haven’t learned to do very well yet and one of the things that I’m devoting a lot of my time and money to is helping to develop better practices on exit timing and I hope helping hundreds of companies do it better. One of my famous quotes in one of my famous and very popular videos is one that I call, “Don’t ride it over the top.” What I’m trying to put in the minds of the entrepreneurs and the shareholders is that image of riding it over the top, waiting too long to exit, starting down on that negative slope where the value is decreasing and you can’t stop it and then you end up selling. I’m trying to help people visualize in the private market where we can’t see the price of the stock every day, helping them understand how to best estimate the optimum exit timing and how to sell somewhere near the top of the value in their business rather than the alternative.
Noah Rosenfarb: I was with a client the other day, actually his 65th birthday and we spent in the office talking about his exit, him and his wife. They just had their second grand kid and here he is on his 65th birthday and he says, “You know, I’d like to work another five or 10 years,”and I’m suggesting to him that he could work five or 10 years and potentially get the same price, total value, total return between today and 10 years from now that he could get it today and not have to work, not have the risk versus maybe waiting 10 years taking out the cash flow over those 10 years and then selling 10 years from now just because I see at the market is willing to pay a premium for a company like his and that premium might not exist forever. Is that the message that you’re sending to a lot of entrepreneurs?
Basil Peters: I think that’s very wise, Noah, and I think that you were providing that gentleman and his wife with some invaluable advice just then. This is another example of something I see almost every day and it breaks my heart. That story you just told me is a very sad story because here is somebody who sounds like they have been successful, who sounds like at 65 should be enjoying their life, who probably because they aren’t a M&A professional doesn’t appreciate that this is the best M&A market we’ve seen for 15 years at least and also probably being not a student of the markets but probably an expert in his own business, but not an expert in the financial cycles doesn’t appreciate that even if he does work for the next 10 years, there’s a really good chance he’ll never get the price he could get today even if doubles the size of the business. If we just return to historic valuations, he might not get as much as he could today.
Here’s a gentleman, I think if he doesn’t take your advice really quickly and start right now, I’m really worried that 10 years from now, he’ll have worked hard for 10 years, he’ll have shortened the remainder of his life by working too hard for 10 years. He’ll end up with less money then than if he’d sold now and gone to the most expensive resort in the world, stay there with his wife, I hope she’s listening, stay there and they still have more money left over. A better part of that, Noah, just to reinforce and to make it even more hit it home a little bit harder. I think that every company will have an exit and I think that they kind of divide into three categories. There’s the people who have a strategy, a good exit strategy and there are opportunities to sell the company well for an incredibly good price especially these days or as I see happen far too often, they end up selling the company for far less than they could have because they didn’t have the strategy and also because they didn’t have the professionals to help them and quite frankly, they get taken advantage of by the buyers.
But the worst thing that I see is far too often for people of the generation you were talking about a minute ago, they very often get wheeled out of their offices. I see and I have so many friends who are mid-60s, early 70s, they have been eating right, they have been working out, feel invincible. I hate when I get a call from the wife who is now the CEO, who is completely devastated by the loss of her husband and is now the shareholder and CEO and everything else in that company. I think that if more CEOs, if more business owners could see that future, they would be lined at your office and they would be taking the advice that you were giving that gentleman who was 65 years old.
Noah Rosenfarb: Well unfortunately, the surveys are that 85% of people don’t have a plan, right, even though if they are in their 50s and even into their 60s. People are averse to planning for what’s going to happen to their business. How are you persuading them to put pen to paper and come up with a strategy?
Basil Peters: I think there’s two parts to it. The hard part is human psychology and the easy part is education about M&A. I’m at a point in my own career where I’m fortunate that I get to do whatever I want and I spend about a third of my time, the enjoyable third of my time putting back by helping to educate business owners, investors, CEOs, and boards about exit strategy. That’s what I think of as fun. That’s what I do in my weekends and whenever I get the chance. The harder part though is much more subtle and that’s the human psychology. You’re absolutely right that most of those owners don’t have an exit strategy in part because it ties into their own perception of mortality. So many founders especially like myself and most of my friends start businesses and their own identities become intertwined with the business. They start to be confused about where their personal identity ends and the business begins. Like most of us, we all aspire at least to live forever, that combination of that identity fussiness and that mortality denial often leads business owners not to have an exit strategy.
It’s the same reason by the way that lots of very wealthy people don’t have a will is that they don’t want to put their minds to the fact that they might not be doing what they are doing and having so much fun doing forever. Whenever I get the chance, I put my time and some of my money towards the education part and I’d even spoken at M&A advisory conference a few years ago in Chicago and I did a talk on the psychology of exits. I had about 500 M&A advisors in the room and I was polling them by show of hands how many of them had appreciated what a large part of the work that we do is actually psychology rather than just finance.
Noah Rosenfarb: Did you ever imagine that going through engineering school?
Basil Peters: No I didn’t but it’s absolutely a part of it. Dealing with the very important psychological aspects of an exit strategy and an exit execution is something that I wish every business owner have the opportunity to take advantage of. To be able to work with somebody who had gone through the same thing themselves and then gone through it several dozen times with other similar types of business owners, it’s an important part of it. It’s an important part of what I would consider a successful exit.
Noah Rosenfarb: We at my firm profess that the reason owners don’t have a plan whether it’s a plan for how they are going to exit their business or a plan for their finances or a plan for their estate, it’s because they don’t have clarity around their goals and objectives. At least in my world, the entrepreneurs that I deal with when they’ve got their sights set on something, there’s no stopping them. They are going to leave a wake behind them. If they have clarity of what they want to accomplish, they are going to get there and yet when it comes to personal finance, tax and estate planning or business succession planning, it’s not a topic that creates a lot of enthusiasm because they are not sure what their options are. Do you see that could be true with the people you speak with?
Basil Peters: Absolutely. I think that’s universal and for some of the reasons I was saying before but you extended it, absolutely you’re right. If they had clarity on that exit strategy, the chances go up dramatically of having a successful exit. To me, it’s astounding that these people are such successful business people and in no other aspect of their business would they not have a strategy and a plan except in this case for the very most important thing they have ever done, the largest transaction they have ever done in their lives, no strategy, no plan, not even any serious thoughts lots of the time. Again, it’s an example of where our psychology defeats us. It’s not that these people are bad business people, it’s that their human psychology in my opinion prevents them from objectively assessing that element of their business because it’s so intertwined with their personal identity.
Noah Rosenfarb: So aside from creating a plan, what else could owners do to increase their probability of a successful exit?
Basil Peters: Great question. It all starts in my opinion with that strategy and when I say exit strategy, Noah, I’m not talking about something very complicated. I’m talking about having a realistic goal for when you want to sell the company and how much you want to sell it for. I think that’s a lot easier to do than most business people would think. It often requires some outside input. It requires some professional judgment especially on the valuation side. A lot of business owners could pick when they would like to sell and that’s often driven by some personal goals. It’s often driven by some business goals. It should be driven more often by the M&A market as you and I have been talking about, but once you’ve got clarity on a strategy, when and how much, then as you said a minute ago, it comes down to execution.
Execution when I was doing it the first time, was pretty mysterious but I’m not sure how many exit transactions you’ve actually lived through as a professional, Noah, but for me, I remember a time, a decade or so ago, when all of a sudden it became easy because all of a sudden, you get to a point in your career after you’ve done a few dozen eggs that’s where you think “This is exactly what has happened in the majority of the situations before. I’d seen this before. Same things happening again” and like any other human endeavor or any other aspect of business, when you do something enough times, you get better at it and it’s the same reason that you don’t want to have a surgeon who is in their early 30s. If you’re going to get some surgery done, I don’t know about you but I want the guy with the gray hair and the grizzled face who I think is probably done that same surgery 500 times before. That’s who I want holding the scalpel if it’s me on the table.
It’s the same thing with the exit. When it comes the time to sell the company you’ve been building for decades or longer, you want to have somebody who has been there and done it enough times so they really are an expert. There’s just no shortcut to learning by doing when you’re talking about selling companies. There’s no way you can go to school and learn about it. There are no textbooks you can read about how to sell a company well so part of the execution is building a team that’s going to execute your plan to the very highest quality and ultimate end result, which is really the price and the terms you’re going to get. A large part of why I think so few owners have successful exits is that they do another thing that they would never do in their business which is they under resource the project. They don’t actually get the best people available and they don’t put the resources to the project, and like anything else in business, they don’t end up with the best end result simply because they’ve under resourced.
Noah Rosenfarb: Chris Mercer was on the show recently and he has what he refers to as the 1% solution. Take 1% of the value of your company and invest that in your planning process around how to maximize value. Do you think that’s the right budget? A $20 million company spends $200,000 a year and a $5 million company could spend $50,000 a year just putting the pieces in place.
Basil Peters: I haven’t heard of it specifically as a budget item but it’s an interesting way to look at it. I think when you put it in those terms, most business owners would say, “Yeah that seems like a reasonable thing to do.” I think that most of the work in developing an exit strategy is usually not hard cash outlay. Most of the time, I think the work is talking with the other stake holders, it’s thinking about it, it’s talking to professionals about what’s possible so to me in my experience, it’s more of a budget of time and thought than it is in dollars, but yeah, I like that 1%.
Noah Rosenfarb: His corollary was you pay 1% to have the asset manager manage your portfolio so why not pay 1% to your board or advisors to help you through this strategy of how to create value and successful exit. I like it. I’ll mention another guest we had on the show was saying they encourage CEOs to spend 25% of their time thinking about how to build value and exit successfully with their 3-5 years out from a transaction. That took me a little bit by surprise but I thought, the reality is that most owners, they are looking to a banker and for the banker to basically carry through a process but they are so far behind the 8 ball. By the time they hire the banker, they don’t know about the data room, they don’t about due diligence, they don’t know really what to expect. They don’t know what’s going to happen as they walk down the road with some private equity firms or some strategic acquirers that have been there and done that, and how they are going to get beat up. What are some of the things these owners should be doing to increase the probability of a successful exit aside from that plan, aside from making sure they are being thoughtful, any tactical pieces to it?
Basil Peters: I just want to go back for a minute. I think I’m going to disagree pretty violently with what you said a minute ago. If I heard you right, you said that one of your other guests suggested that a CEO should spend 25% of their time for three years prior to the exit thinking about ensuring that transaction was a success. Did I hear that right?
Noah Rosenfarb: Essentially yeah, meeting with private equity firms, meeting with bankers, spending time, putting your ear to the ground listening to the market place.
Basil Peters: After I sold my first company by the way and I won’t go too far into my background but I have been a professional investor for a couple of decades. I’ve made about 100 investments myself mostly in technology companies and as a shareholder, I don’t think 25% is nearly enough time. In fact I think that CEO has exactly one job and that one job if I’m a shareholder is to increase the shareholder value and optimize the timing of its monetization. For me and I would suggest for every company, the CEO’s job is to increase the value and then to turn it back into cash. I think it’s their only job and so for me if the CEO said,“I’m going to put 25% into that job,” I’d be looking for a new CEO. I’d want somebody who devoted every waking minute to increasing the value and to optimizing the timing of that exit.
Another one of my messages is that you have to understand why you have a business. Some people have a business because it’s part of their personal aggrandizement. They want to be famous or they want to be something. That’s fine. They can do that if they want, but if you want me to be a shareholder, then I’m a pretty simple guy. I want you to make me some money. If what you’re doing in a business is making money, then for the vast majority of businesses that have external shareholders, it’s about one simple thing. Get the price up and turn it back into cash. That exit strategy is unbelievably powerful in clarifying that in the minds of the CEO and the board. Once you get down to the basics, once you understand really why you’re going to work in the morning, it gets much easier to create that value and just to continue on that way just a little bit longer. One of the things I wish I knew when I was a young entrepreneur running my first company was something that is being propagated out of a group in Ohio called the Ohio Tech Angels.
The Ohio Tech Angels I think are ahead of anybody else in the country in really understanding the creation and alignment of that exit strategy in the organization. What the Ohio Tech Angels are doing now is they are reaffirming the exit strategy at every board meeting. At the beginning of every board meeting, the chairman reads the minutes and the first item on every agenda is, “Okay, give the exit strategy that we have agreed to. Again, it’s simple, when and how much. Is there any discussion anybody think that we need to think about changing that, if not, let’s have a show of hands and ratify that that’s the reason that we’re all here and the purpose of the company that’s the CEO’s job, execute the exit strategy.” We can’t prove it yet. I think we’ll need another 10 years or so but I think that in a decade, you’ll be able to go back and look at the portfolio of the Ohio Tech Angels. I’ll be willing to bet my house they are going to have a higher return simply because of that clarification and that regular reinforcement of the primary function of the company, which is to create shareholder value which they are doing at every board meeting. I think it’s brilliant.
Noah Rosenfarb: I love it. I’m going to implement that with all my holdings now. I love it. I do quarterly board meetings at insular companies and we talk about our three-year target and our 10-year target, but we don’t quantify the price and the timing for when we want to exit. I think that one simple change will make those issues manifest more readily, the pure philosophy that if we put it out there, it’s more likely to happen than if we don’t talk about it. I do have one company that I was a series A investor but they are going to raise series B pretty soon and they are very clear, $100 million in 2020, that’s their timeline, 35% IRR to the series B investor. They’ve got it mapped out and that was attractive to me. I think everything that you just said there leaves me to believe that that’s a very powerful simple to implement strategy. Thank you for that.
Basil Peters: Thank you and I’m really happy to hear that there are companies out there with that clarity. I think if we could do a double blind study and we had half of the companies that had that clarity, half that didn’t, and you measured the outcomes, measured the results, it would be a staggering difference in how much money those shareholders made, and the shareholders in the companies with clarity on the goal I think would be so much more wealthy. Again, simple yet incredibly powerful thing that I hope more and more companies adapt.
Noah Rosenfarb: I would say based on what you said about a CEO’s job being 100% focused on growing shareholder value, versus the other guest I had said was 25%, a lot of that is the perspective of who is the shareholder and do you have outside shareholders, is it really a closely held lifestyle type family business, but in either event, the family or the owner that had outside shareholders, everybody should be in agreement on when we’re going to sell it and how much we’re going to sell it for. It would help to not miss the bus when it comes by, which I have seen all too often happen to entrepreneurs. They get a great offer and they are just not ready to accept it and by the time they are ready to accept an offer, the market has changed on them, business has changed on them, their health has changed on them, whatever the circumstances are and the value is just not there the way it was when opportunity presented itself.
Basil Peters: I see that all the time too, Noah, and it just breaks my heart. In fact, to really be brutally honest about what’s actually happening out there, I also talk at conferences about the fact that I believe only 25% of the companies that could be sold end up being successfully sold. What I’m saying is that of the companies that were valuable, the companies that could have been sold, only 25% exit well. They have what a lot of people call a happy exit. There’s a great book that was written this year called "Finish Big."
Noah Rosenfarb: Bo was just on the show. Bo was our last guest right before you. There you go.
Basil Peters: Bo did us all a service because he put five years of his life into writing Finish Big and what he did that I hadn’t ever seen written before is he interviewed not just the people who had successful exits. He interviewed a lot of people who had what I call unsuccessful exits. Bo calls them unhappy exits or unhappy after. He didn’t coin that specific phrase but "Finish Big" I think should be required reading for any CEO or business owner because it gives you a chance through his amazingly skillful writing see the two types of exits – the successful and the unsuccessful.
To me as a business owner, as an investor through most of my life, that 25% is a terrifyingly small percentage. We blow it 75% of the time. For the business owners that are listening to this, there’s a 75% chance they are not going to have a successful exit. This is unbelievably bad news I think in one way because what it means is all of these lost wealth that families, that shareholders, that investors are going to have because these companies aren’t executing their exits better. There are lots of reasons why this happens. In my full day workshop, I spend hours going through the various mechanisms that I’d seen contribute to these unsuccessful exits. I won’t try and do that now on this call but if anybody is interested, they can have a look at the videos on my blog where I’ve recorded some of these workshops and I’ve described all of the main reasons that companies don’t have successful exits and what I’m really trying to do is to get across what can be done to increase that from that terrible 25% to I think 50%.
I think we could get it right half the time and that’s me perhaps being an entrepreneur and being that indefatigable optimist that I think we can be twice as good as we are now, but I think that just through knowledge and education, we could get to the point in the not too distant future where half of the companies that were sold had successful exits. I think if we could just do that one thing, it would make an enormous difference in the overall economic growth of the country. You’d see the GDP of the country increase if we could just capture that enormous amount of wealth that’s not in circulation because so many of those companies had less than optimum exits.
Noah Rosenfarb: That’s the reason we do the show. You couldn’t have said it better than me. I appreciate you coming on to talk to our audience. If they want to read your blog, read your book, where should they go?
Basil Peters: The easiest thing to do is just go to www.Exits.com. You can see everything that I’ve written on all those nights and weekends on my blog which is just Exits.com/blog but I’m easy to find. You can search Basil Peters. You can search Exits and you’ll find my material. My sincere hope is that some of that content is going to help business owners, help CEOs, help boards just do it better than they might have without that additional knowledge and education.
Noah Rosenfarb: Thanks so much for coming on the show. We certainly share in the same mission of helping entrepreneurs succeed and I appreciate the thought leadership that you’re providing in the field. Thanks again.
Basil Peters: Thank you, Noah.
Noah Rosenfarb: Alright, take care. To everyone, don’t forget to rate us on iTunes and if you have any future guests for the show, email them in to me, Noah@FreedomADV.com.
Article LINK

For additional information regarding Florida business sales, acquisitions and valuations, please contact Eric J. Gall at Eric@EdisonAvenue.com or 239.738.6227. Also, visit our Edison Avenue website at www.EdisonAvenue.com or my personal website at www.BuySellFLbiz.com.